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Abstract. We report the suitability of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
entanglement source for gaussian continuous-variable quantum key distribution at
1550 nm. Our source is based on a single continuous-wave squeezed vacuum mode
combined with a vacuum mode at a balanced beam splitter. Extending a recent
security proof, we characterize the source by quantifying the extractable length
of a composable secure key from a finite number of samples under the assumption
of collective attacks. We show that distances in the order of 10 km are achievable
with this source for a reasonable sample size despite the fact that the entanglement
was generated including a vacuum mode. Our security analysis applies to all states
having an asymmetry in the field quadrature variances, including those generated
by superposition of two squeezed modes with different squeezing strengths.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote parties to generate a shared
key which is guaranteed to be unknown to any potential eavesdropper. Discrete
variable systems implementing, for example, the famous BB84 protocol [1] are
well established [2] and commercial systems exist. Recently, also first commercial
continuous variable (CV) systems have been launched in which the field quadratures
of laser light are measured by homodyne detection. Compared to discrete variable
systems, they have the advantage that for homodyne detection PIN photo diodes can
be used which are well developed and widely used telecommunication components.
They offer high bandwidth, low dark noise and high quantum efficiencies. Most
of todays CV quantum key distribution systems use prepare-and-measure schemes
employing coherent states with gaussian or discrete modulation [3] - [7]. Prepare-
and-measure schemes with squeezed states have been considered in [8, 9]. The less
common entanglement-based schemes do not need signal modulation [10], and instead
exploit directly the correlations in the field quadratures of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) entangled state. EPR entangled states are usually generated by interfering two
squeezed beams at a beam splitter [11] - [22].
An implementation of a suitable source for an CV entanglement-based scheme was
shown in [23] and a demonstration of a fully implemented table-top QKD was done
in [24]. In both cases the security analysis assumed an infinite number of measured
samples which is experimentally unfeasible. Security proofs for CV systems including
the effect of a finite number of samples were only recently published [25, 26]. In [27] an
experiment including finite-size effects was performed using gaussian modulation and
coherent states with a security analysis under the assumption of collective attacks.
In this paper we characterize EPR entangled states generated by superimposing
a squeezed vacuum mode with a vacuum mode at a balanced beam splitter in terms
of extractable key length. Using only one squeezed mode instead of two minimizes
the necessary resources and reduces the complexity of the setup. Our source is
implemented at the telecommunication wavelength of 1550 nm to, in principle, allow
for efficient coupling to existing telecommunication fiber networks. We calculate the
extractable key rate as a function of measured samples for various communication
distances through an optical fiber. We assume that the source is located in the lab of
an honest party such that only one part of the beam is affected by transmission losses.
The key rate is computed by applying the security proof for composable security under
the assumption of collective attacks including finite-size effects given in [26] to states
with asymmetric field quadrature variances. As asymmetries in the field quadrature
variances are experimentally unavoidable even for entanglement generated by two
squeezed modes, our analysis can also be applied to such states.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the protocol, give the
security definitions and extend the proof given in [26] to asymmetric states. Section 3
is devoted to the details of the experimental setup. The main results are presented in
Section 4. The paper ends with the conclusions in Section 5.
2. Security Analysis
In this section we extend the security proof for composable security against collective
Gaussian attacks including finite-size effects given in [26] towards two-mode squeezed
states with an asymmetry of the noise distributions of the field quadratures. By
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superimposing a squeezed mode with a vacuum mode at a balanced beam splitter the
two output modes are still squeezed in one quadrature which we assume to be the
amplitude quadrature X, and anti-squeezed in the orthogonal quadrature, the phase
quadrature P .
2.1. Protocol
The protocol we use goes as follows:
(i) Preparation and measurement: Alice prepares an entangled state with her EPR
source, keeps one subsystem and sends the other to Bob. Both parties perform
homodyne measurements in either the X or P quadrature which is individually
chosen at random. An outcome of such a synchronous measurement is called a
sample. This process is repeated until 2N samples were recorded, forming two
strings x′′A and x
′′
B of length 2N .
(ii) Sifting: In the second step Alice and Bob perform sifting, i.e. they communicate
which quadrature they measured. Samples measured with a different choice of
quadrature are discarded from x′′A and x
′′
B leaving Alice and Bob with strings
x′A and x
′
B of length N in average. The discarded data is used for parameter
estimation.
(iii) Parameter estimation: In the third step Alice and Bob choose randomly a common
subset of length k from x′A and x
′
B which they reveal. From this data and the
data discarded by the sifting procedure, they reconstruct the covariance matrix.
In particular, they estimate a confidence set Cpe with the property that with
probability 1− pe the real covariance matrix lies within Cpe .
(iv) (Optional) Discarding X or P quadrature measurements: As the X and P
quadrature measurements of Alice and Bob are correlated with different strength
due to the asymmetric nature of the bipartite entangled state, it might be
beneficial to discard the measurements performed in the P quadrature from
the raw key. To take into account all three possibilities, i.e. discarding
X measurements, discarding P measurements and discarding nothing at all,
we introduce a parameter pX which describes the probability of a sample
being measured in the X quadrature. For taking both X and P quadrature
measurements to generate a raw key pX ≈ 0.5 depending on the actual run. By
discarding all X measurements pX = 0 and pX = 1 for dicarding all P quadrature
measurements. The number of samples left after this step is denoted by n.
(v) Binning: In the fourth step Alice and Bob group their unrevealed samples
into bins
(−∞,−α{X,P} + δ{X,P}), (−α{X,P} + δ{X,P},−α{X,P} + 2δ{X,P}), . . .,(
α{X,P} − δ{X,P},∞
)
. Each bin is assigned a unique bit combination so that after
the conversion Alice and Bob both have a bit string representing their raw key. In
practice, we always choose α such that for no sample the quadrature measurement
exceeded α. In that sense, only δ is a free parameter in the protocol.
(vi) Classical Postprocessing: In the last step Alice and Bob perform error correction
and privacy amplification to extract ` secure bits. We assume that they execute
a reverse information reconciliation protocol (error correction) in which Bob only
sends information to Alice and denote the number of bits revealed by Bob by
`EC. In the final privacy amplification step both parties apply two-universal hash
functions to reduce the key length to ` bits, where ` is computed according to
Eq. (3).
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2.2. Security definitions
It is important to ensure that the key is secure in any further cryptographic sub-
protocol like for instance the one-time pad to securely transmit messages between Alice
and Bob. To guarantee this we use the composable security definitions from [28, 29].
In the following, we denote by SA and SB the random variables associated with the
final key of Alice and Bob at the very end of the protocol.
Robustness. We call a protocol robust if it does not abort when no eavesdropper is
present. This ensures that the protocol is not trivial.
Correctness. A protocol is c-correct if
Prob[SA 6= SB ] ≤ c .
If c  1, this implies that Alice’s and Bob’s key agree with high probability.
Secrecy. Let ωSBE denote the classical-quantum state of Bob’s final key SB and a
possible eavesdropper E. Such a state can always be written as
ωSBE =
∑
sB∈SB
p(sB)|sB〉〈sB | ⊗ ωsBE ,
where p(sB) is the probability distribution of the key. We then call a protocol s-secret
if for any eavesdropper E
ppass
2
‖ωSBE − τSB ⊗ ωE‖1 ≤ s
holds. Here, ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm, τSB is the uniform distribution over SB , ωE is
the reduced state of ωSBE and 1− p pass is the probability that the protocol aborts.
Security A protocol is -secure if it is c-correct and s-secret with c + s ≤ .
For a detailed discussion of the above security conditions we refer to [30].
2.3. Secure Key Rates
Let us consider the stage of the protocol before applying error correction and privacy
amplification. We call the remaining n samples at this stage the raw keys and denote
the corresponding random variables on Alice’s and Bob’s side by XnA and X
n
B . One
can assume that XnA and X
n
B are obtained by performing n times a quadrature
measurement where amplitude X is chosen with probability pX and phase P with
pP = 1 − pX . Note that for the following security discussion pX can be arbitrarily
chosen. Let in the following En be the eavesdropper system which can be infinite-
dimensional and ωXnAXnBEn the corresponding classical-quantum state conditioned on
the event that the protocol passes. It was shown in [31] that an c-correct and s-secret
key of length
max
1
[
Hmin(XB |E)ω − `EC − log2
1
421c
]
(1)
can be extracted. Hmin(X
n
B |En)ω denotes the conditional smooth min-entropy of
ωXnBEn for  ≤ (s − 1)/2 introduced in [29] and generalized to infinite-dimensional
systems in [31, 32]. Hence, it remains to obtain a lower bound on Hmin(X
n
B |En)ω for
any possible eavesdropping strategy.
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Under the assumption of collective attacks, we can assume that the state
ωXnAXnBEn has tensor product structur, i.e., ωXnAXnBEn = ω
⊗n
XAXBE
. The smooth min-
entropy of a product state can then be approximated by the conditional von Neumann
entropy H(XB |E)ω of ωXBE via the asymptotic equipartition property [32]
Hmin(XB |E)ω ≤ nH(XB |E)ω −
√
n∆ , (2)
where n has to be sufficiently large and
∆ = 4 log2
(
2
1
2Hmax(XB)+1 + 1
)√
log2
2
2
.
In the next step, we use that the state ωXBE is of form ωXBE = pX |X〉〈X|θ⊗ωXXBE +
(1− pX)|P 〉〈P |θ ⊗ωPXBE where ωXXBE , ωPXBE are the states obtained when the honest
parties are measuring amplitude or phase, respectively. The system denoted by θ
is a classical register which is assigned to the eavesdropper and keeps track which
measurements were performed by the honest parties. Using elementary properties of
the von Neumann entropy, we can now expand H(XB |Eθ)ω = pXH(XB |E)ωX +
pPH(XB |E)ωP . Combining this estimation of the smooth min-entropy with the
assumption of Gaussian attacks, we can use the confidence set Cpe to obtain a lower
bound on the key length given by
` = n · inf
γ∈Cpe
∑
θ
pθH(XB |E)ωγ,θ −
√
n∆− `EC − log2
1
2sc
. (3)
Here, the infimum is taken over all states compatible with covariance matrices γ within
the confident set. For simplicity, we have chosen 1 = s/2 which can be justified by
the fact that for large enough n the term in the logarithm can be neglected. Note
further that due to the definition of Cpe , the key length from Eq. (3) is now -secure
with  = pe + s + c.
The von Neumann entropy for both quadratures θ = X,P can now be computed
under the non-restricting assumption that the eavesdropper holds the purification
of Alice’s and Bob’s state, that is, we assume that ωγABE is the purification of
the Gaussian state ωγAB with covariance matrix γ. It then follows by applying the
definition of the conditional von Neumann entropy H(XB |E) = H(XBE)−H(E) and
the self-duality H(E)ωγ = H(AB)ωγ that
H(XB |E)ωγ,θ = H(E|XB)ωγ,θ +H(XB)ωγ,θ −H(AB)ωγ . (4)
As shown in [26, 33, 34]
H(E|XB)ωγ,X ≥ H(E)ωγ,X(X=0) = H
(
A− C(MXBMX)MPCT
)
ωγ
and
H(E|XB)ωγ,P ≥ H(E)ωγ,P (P=0) = H
(
A− C(MPBMP )MPCT
)
ωγ
,
where H(E)ωγ,{X,P}({X,P}=0) is the post-measurement state at the eavesdropper’s side
when Bob measured X = 0 or P = 0. The bipartite covariance matrix is written in
block form, i.e.
γ =
(
A C
CT B
)
and MX = diag(1, 0) and MP = diag(0, 1) are the projectors to the X and P
quadrature, respectively. MP denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse.
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To compute ∆, we have to estimate Hmax(XB) which can be approximated by [32]
Hmax(XB) ≤ 2 log2
(√
pX
∑
y
√
ωXXB (y) +
√
(1− pX)
∑
y
√
ωPXB (y)
)
,
where ωXXB and ω
P
XB
are the probability distributions of Bob’s X and P quadrature
measurements, respectively.
While in a practical experiment the number of bits `EC can be directly measured
for each run, we need to estimate the leakage term here. We assume the term to
be [35]
`EC = pX (H(XB)ωγ,X − βI(XA, XB)ωγ,X )
+ (1− pX) (H(XB)ωγ,P − βI(XA, XB)ωγ,P ) ,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the error correction efficiency and I(A,B) is the mutual information.
In this paper we will assume an error correction efficiency of β = 0.9 [36].
With these results the secure key rate r = `/n can be calculated by
r = inf
γ∈Cpe
pX [H(E|XB)ωγ,X +H(XB)ωγ,X ]
+ (1− pX) [H(E|XB)ωγ,P +H(XB)ωγ,P ]
−H(AB)ωγ − 1√
n
∆− `EC
n
− 1
n
log2
1
2sc
In the theoretical asymptotic limit for an infinite number of samples n → ∞ and
perfect security → 0, the key rate r tends to
r∞ = pX (βI(XA, XB)ωγ,X +H(E)ωγ,X(X=0) −H(AB)ωγ )
+ (1− pX) (βI(XA, XB)ωγ,P +H(E)ωγ,P (P=0) −H(AB)ωγ ) .
Note that in the asymptotic limit the error correction protocol achieves the Shannen
rate, and thus, one could set β = 1. However, since we only use the asymptotic limit to
compare the key rate to the finite-size effects which are not connected to the efficiency
of the error correction protocol, we treat β as a constant over all sample sizes.
2.4. Parameter Estimation
To calculate the secure key rate we need to construct the confidence set Cpe which
is defined such that the covariance matrix describing the real state lies within Cpe
with probability 1 − pe. As our states are two-mode squeezed vacuum states, the
first moment vanishes and the state is fully described by its covariance matrix. It is
reconstructed during the parameter estimation step from the discarded samples and
the revealed common subset of length k using a maximum likelihood estimator. The
sample covariance matrix is then estimated by
γ˜µν =
1
nµν
nµν∑
i=1
xµi x
ν
i ,
where xµi and x
ν
i are the samples measured simultaneously by Alice and Bob in µ
and ν quadrature, respectively. nµν is the number of samples used for the covariance
estimation which might in our case be different for different entries. The distribution
of the sample covariance matrix γ˜ is given by [37]
nγ˜ ∼W4(γ, n− 1) ,
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where W4(γ, n − 1) is the Wishart distribution. Hence, the standard deviation for a
single entry of the covariance matrix takes the form
σµν ≈
√
γ˜2µν + γ˜µµγ˜νν
nµν
.
For a large enough number of samples the confidence set is then constructed by
Cpe =
{
γ|γ˜µν − zpeσµν ≤ γµν ≤ γ˜µν + zpeσµν
}
, (5)
where zpe is chosen such that
1− erf
(
zpe√
2
)
≤ pe
is fulfilled. Here, erf is the error function which is defined by
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
dt exp
(−t2) .
3. Experiment
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Figure 1: Schematic of the experiment: The beam of a 1550 nm fiber laser (red)
was frequency doubled (yellow) and used as a pump for the squeezed-light source.
The squeezed beam was overlapped with a vacuum mode at a 50 : 50 beam splitter
to produce a pair of EPR entangled beams. The field quadratures of both beams
were measured by balanced homodyne detection to characterize the EPR source
and to provide data points that can be used to extract a secret quantum key from
simultaneous measurements of the amplitude or phase quadrature. AOM: acousto-
optical modulator, PD: photo diode.
A schematic of the experiment is shown in Fig. 1. The EPR entanglement source
was driven by a commercial 1 W 1550 nm fiber laser. Most of its power was frequency
doubled in a quasi phase-matched periodically poled potassium titanyl phosphate
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(PPKTP) crystal [38] and served as a pump for the squeezed-light source which
consisted of a 1× 2× 9.3 mm3 PPKTP crystal. One of the end faces of the squeezed-
light source’s crystal was curved with a radius of curvature of 12 mm and coated with
a high-reflective coating for both the pump and the fundamental beam at 775 nm
and 1550 nm, respectively. The other end face was flat and anti-reflective coated for
both wavelengths. Together with a coupling mirror with a radius of curvature of
25 mm a hemilithic cavity was formed. The coupling mirror had a reflectivity of 90 %
for 1550 nm and a reflectivity of 20 % for 775 nm. With a 23 mm air gap between
the crystal and the coupling mirror the cavity had a finesse of 60 at 1550 nm, a free
spectral range of 3.8 GHz and a full width half maximum linewidth of 63 MHz. The
temperature of the PPKTP crystal was tuned to about 50◦C to achieve quasi phase-
matching. A sub-milliwatt control beam which was coupled into the cavity through
the high-reflective mirror, was used to lock both the length of the cavity and the phase
of the pump. The output of the squeezed-light source was split from the pump by
a dichroic beam splitter and superimposed with a vacuum mode at a balanced beam
splitter to produce a pair of EPR entangled beams. The field quadratures of these
beams were measured by homodyne detection. For this each beam was overlapped with
a strong local oscillator of about 10 mW at a balanced beam splitter with a visibility
of about 99.5 % and detected by a pair of custom-made PIN photo diodes with high
quantum efficiency. By changing the relative phase between the local oscillator and the
quantum field the measured field quadrature could be chosen. Whereas for quantum
key distribution Alice and Bob only have to randomly measure the amplitude and
phase quadrature, also a linear combination of these is needed to reconstruct the
full covariance matrix. Therefore we implemented a single sideband technique to
be able to lock both homodyne detectors independently to any quadrature angle.
An 80 MHz frequency shifted beam, produced by an acousto-optical modulator, was
coupled into the squeezing path through the dichroic beam splitter and was phase
locked to the control beam leaking through it. The single sideband was detected by
the homodyne detectors and demodulated at 80 MHz. By choosing the phase of the
electronic oscillator used for the demodulation the homodyne detector could be set to
measure any field quadrature angle.
The outputs of both homodyne detectors were recorded simultaneously by a data
acquisition system for which they were demodulated with a double-balanced mixer at
8.3 MHz and lowpass filtered with an anti-aliasing filter with a passband of 40 kHz.
The data was sampled with 14 bit resolution at a sampling rate of 500 kHz.
4. Experimental Results
To characterize our EPR source we fully reconstructed the covariance matrix of the
bipartite state. The full reconstruction of the covariance matrix followed a protocol
described in [23], where the complete covariance matrix of a gaussian state was
measured for the first time. The protocol goes as follows:
(i) Alice and Bob both measure the amplitude quadrature.
(ii) Alice and Bob both measure the phase quadrature.
(iii) Alice measures the amplitude quadrature, whereas Bob simultaneously measures
the phase quadrature.
(iv) Alice measures the phase quadrature, whereas Bob simultaneously measures the
amplitude quadrature.
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(a) Includes only X quadrature measurements, i.e. pX = 1.
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(b) Includes only P quadrature measurements, i.e. pX = 0.
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(c) Includes both X and P quadrature measurements, i.e. pX =
0.5. nbits = 6 for the X quadrature and nbits = 7 for the P
quadrature.
Figure 2: Secure key rate versus the number of measured samples. The key rate on the
y-axis is given in secure bits per raw key sample, i.e. it is normalized to the number
of samples left after sifting and parameter estimation.
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(v) Alice and Bob both measure a linear combination of the amplitude and phase
quadrature. In our case we chose the 45◦ angle for both parties.
Following the protocol above we recorded 5 × 106 samples for each quadrature
combination using a pump power of 235 mW for the squeezed-light source which
allowed the observation of 11.1 dB squeezing and 16.6 dB anti-squeezing. From these
data we reconstructed the covariance matrix which reads
Γ =

0.541 0.135 0.459 −0.095
0.135 24.633 −0.037 −23.293
0.459 −0.037 0.548 0.264
−0.095 −23.293 0.264 23.840
 . (6)
One can directly see certain properties of the state from the entries in the matrix.
The values on the principal diagonal are the variances for the amplitude and phase
quadrature measurements at Alice’s and Bob’s detector. The diagonal entries of the
two blocks in the upper right and lower left give the strengths of the correlations in the
amplitude quadrature and the anti-correlations in the phase quadrature, respectively,
between both detectors. In a perfect orthogonal measurement the remaining entries
should turn out to be zero since they give the covariance between amplitude and
phase quadratures. The small deviations from zero show that the measurements were
not perfectly orthogonal but close. To verify that our source is indeed an Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen source we calculated the EPR-Reid covariance product [39]
min
g
Var(XA − gXB) ·min
h
Var(PA − hPB) < 1 ,
which was 0.31 < 1 for our states setting a new benchmark with entanglement
generated by a squeezed mode superimposed with a vacuum mode.
Using the recorded data we analysed the feasibility to use our state for quantum
key distribution. For all calculations we assumed the covariance matrix of Eq. (6)
to be the reconstructed covariance matrix in the parameter estimation phase of the
quantum key distribution protocol, regardless for how many samples the key rate
was calculated. We then constructed the confidence set assuming k = 106 samples
were used to estimate the correlation terms between Alice and Bob in the covariance
matrix. All diagonal terms were assumed to be estimated by using the total of N
samples measured in one quadrature by each party.
Figure 2a shows the calculated key rate for our state versus the total number
of measured samples when omitting all samples measured in the P quadrature (anti-
squeezed quadrature), i.e. pX = 1. The key rate is given in secure bits per sample
that can be used to generate the raw key, i.e. the samples left after sifting, parameter
estimation and omission of samples measured in the P quadrature. The parameters
used for the calculation are pe = c = s = 10
−16 and β = 0.9 for the efficiency of
the error correction. α is chosen 8 times the standard deviation of the quadrature
given by the covariance matrix of Eq. (6). Each curve in the figure was calculated for
a different number of bins which was taken as 2nbits by choosing an apropriate δ. For
nbits ≥ 6 the asymptotic maximum of the key rate is reached. For 109 samples, which
is experimentally challenging but achievable [27], the key rate is already close to the
maximum value of about 0.7 bits per sample and even for 108 samples it is not much
lower.
Figure 2b shows the same as Fig. 2a but with the samples from the X quadrature
omitted, i.e. pX = 0. To reach the asymptotic value for the key rate nbits ≥ 7 is needed.
In comparison to the key rate for only the X quadrature samples the asymptotic key
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Figure 3: Key rate versus distance when sending one part of the entangled beam
through an optical fiber. The key rate is given as the number of secure bits per
sample that can be used to generate a key, i.e. after sifting and parameter estimation.
We assumed a coupling efficiency of 95 % into the optical fiber and an optical loss of
0.2 dB/km. The curves are plotted for different total number of measured samples
2N . The parameter estimation security parameter was chosen pe = 10
−16 except for
the dashed lines.
rate is lower and a larger number of samples is necessary for a positive key rate. Here
also about 109 samples are necessary to reach a value close to the maximum and also
for 108 samples the key rate is not much lower.
In Figure 2c samples from both X and P quadrature measurements were used to
compute the secure key rate, i.e. pX = 0.5. For the calculation we used nbits = 6 for
the X quadrature and nbits = 7 for the P quadrature. Although the number of secure
bits per sample is smaller than for considering only samples from the X quadrature,
the number of samples used to generate the raw key is almost twice as large leading
to a larger number of secret keys for the same number of measured samples.
When sending Bob’s part of the entangled state through an optical fiber the
key rate versus the distance is shown in Fig. 3. We assumed a coupling efficiency of
95 % into the optical fiber [40] and an optical loss of 0.2 dB/km. To maximize the
achievable distance we omitted the samples from the P quadrature. Considering only
samples from the P quadrature would yield a maximal distance of only about 2 km
and considering both X and P quadrature measurements would yield about 8 km for
an infinite number of samples. The parameters used for the calculation were chosen
as for Fig. 2, in particular nbits = 6 and pe = 10
−16. From the figure we read that
the absolute maximal distance for our state is about 37 km. Taking a realistic number
of samples [27] the reachable distance shrinks to about 9 km for 108 samples and
about 18 km for 109 samples. These values are limited by the parameter estimation.
Curves with a relaxed parameter estimation security parameter of pe = 10
−12 and
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pe = 10
−10 are shown for 108 samples in the figure. For pe = 10−10 [25] the distance
increases to about 10.5 km. Increasing the number of samples k used for parameter
estimation instead does not change the achievable distances as Cov(XA, XB) is
not critical for our states and Cov(PA, PB) can be estimated more precisely as all
measurements where Alice and Bob measured the P quadrature simultaneously, can
be used. Here Cov denotes the covariance. For the calculation we assumed that no
excess noise is introduced by the fiber as stated in [41]. Excess noise introduced by
the electronic dark noise of the homodyne detectors is instead already included in the
reconstructed covariance matrix. As the error correction efficiency depends on the
given signal-to-noise ratio, the actually maximal achievable distance depends on the
availability of efficient error correcting codes [27].
5. Conclusion
We have presented an analysis of a gaussian entanglement source involving a squeezed
mode and a vacuum mode regarding entanglement-based quantum key distribution
under the assumption of collective attacks including finite-size effects. While in
the present experiment the entanglement has been distributed on an optical table,
coupling one part of the bipartite state into a standard optical telecommunication
fiber and building Bob’s detector remotely would allow for quantum key distribution
in local-area networks. The local oscillator for Bob’s homodyne detector could be
served e.g. from an auxiliary laser at Bob’s site which could be phase locked to
the control beam accompanying the entangled state. This scheme also ensures that
phase noise introduced by the fiber is not crucial below the unity-gain frequency
of the phase-locked loop. Our analysis revealed that a distance of more than ten
kilometers is possible with a reasonable but challenging number of measured samples
of 109 even though a vacuum mode was included in the generation of the states.
As for achieving a large distance only samples measured in the squeezed quadrature
are used, a probability larger than 50 % for measuring the squeezed quadrature
compared to the anti-squeezed quadrature would increase the number of secure bits
generated per second. Since a squeezing bandwidth of more than 100 MHz was
already demonstrated [42], a QKD system involving a single squeezed-light source
could achieve significant overall key rates.
Although the restriction to a single squeezed input mode, as presented here,
reduces the complexity of the source, a full scheme with two squeezed fields
superimposed at a balanced beam splitter will achieve higher key rates. For the full
scheme the achievable distance for 109 samples would be about 28 km in comparison to
about 17 km for a single squeezed-light source. While these values were calculated for
an entangled state generated by two identical squeezed modes, our security analysis
provided here also allows the use of states generated by squeezed modes with different
squeezing strengths.
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